PHILCOM
EMPLOYEES
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
PHILIPPINE
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS Promulgated:
and
PHILCOM CORPORATION,
Respondents. July 17, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
This
is a petition for review[1] to
annul the Decision[2] dated
The
facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Upon the expiration of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner Philcom Employees
Union (PEU or union, for brevity) and private respondent Philippine Global
Communications, Inc. (Philcom, Inc.) on
On
On
On November 19, 1997, then Acting
Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Order assuming jurisdiction
over the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout, whether threatened or
actual, directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that
may exacerbate the situation, directing the striking workers to return to work
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Secretary’s Order and for
management to resume normal operations, as well as accept the workers back
under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties were likewise required to submit
their respective position papers and evidence within ten (10) days from receipt
of said order (Annex “4”, Comment, pp. 610-611, ibid.). On
On
As directed, the parties submitted their respective position papers. In its position paper, the union raised the issue of the alleged unfair labor practice of the company hereunder enumerated as follows:
“(a) PABX transfer and contractualization of PABX service and position;
“(b) Massive contractualization;
“(c) Flexible labor and additional work/function;
“(d) Disallowance of union leave intended for union seminar;
“(e) Misimplementation
and/or non-implementation of employees’ benefits like shoe allowance,
rainboots, raincoats, OIC shift allowance, P450.00 monthly allowance,
driving allowance, motorcycle award and full-time physician;
“(f) Non-payment, discrimination and/or deprivation of overtime, restday work, waiting/stand by time and staff meetings;
“(g) Economic inducement by promotion during CBA negotiation;
“(h) Disinformation scheme, surveillance and interference with union affairs;
“(i) Issuance of memorandum/notice to employees without giving copy to union, change in work schedule at Traffic Records Section and ITTO policies; and
“(j) Inadequate transportation allowance, water and facilities.”
(Annex A, Petition; pp. 110-182, ibid.)
The company, on the other hand, raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union (Annex B, Petition; pp. 302-320, ibid.).
On the premise that public respondent Labor Secretary cannot rule on the issue of the strike since there was no petition to declare the same illegal, petitioner union filed on March 4, 1998 a Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcom’s Position Paper for being irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the issues assumed for resolution (Annex C, Petition; pp. 330-333, ibid.).
In
opposition to PEU’s Manifestation/Motion, the company argued that it was
precisely due to the strike suddenly staged by the union on
On
Going now to the first issue at hand, a reading of the complaints charged by the Union as unfair labor practices would reveal that these are not so within the legal connotation of Article 248 of the Labor Code. On the contrary, these complaints are actually mere grievances which should have been processed through the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration outlined under the CBA. The issues of flexible labor and additional functions, misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of overtime and other monetary claims and inadequate transportation allowance, are all a matter of implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA subject to the grievance procedure.
Neither do these complaints amount
to gross violations which, thus, may be treated as unfair labor practices
outside of the coverage of Article 261.
The
With respect to the charges of contractualization and economic inducement, this Office is convinced that the acts of said company qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative. The act of the Company in contracting out work or certain services being performed by Union members should not be seen as an unfair labor practice act per se. First, the charge of massive contractualization has not been substantiated while the contractualization of the position of PABX operator is an isolated instance. Secondly, in the latter case, there was no proof that such contracting out interfered with, restrained or coerced the employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. Thus, it is not unfair labor practice to contract out work for reason of reduction of labor cost through the acquisition of automatic machines.
Likewise, the promotion of certain
employees, who are incidentally members of the
There remains the issue on
bargaining deadlock. The Company has
denied the existence of any impasse in its CBA negotiations with the
As pointed out by the
We now come to the question of
whether or not the strike staged by the
Considering the precipitous nature
of the sanctions sought by the Company, i.e., declaration of illegality of the
strike and the corresponding termination of the errant Union officers, this
Office deems it wise to defer the summary resolution of the same until both
parties have been afforded due process.
The non-compliance of the strikers with the return-to-work orders, while
it may warrant dismissal, is not by itself conclusive to hold the strikers
liable. Moreover, the
It may be true that the workers struck after the Secretary of Labor and Employment had assumed jurisdiction over the case and that they may have failed to immediately return to work even after the issuance of a return-to-work order, making their continued strike illegal. For, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. But, the liability of each of the union officers and the workers, if any, has yet to be determined. xxx xxx xxx.[4]
The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
The
The
The
Pending resolution of the issues of illegal strike and bargaining deadlock which are yet to be heard, all the striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and Philcom and/or Philcom Corporation are hereby directed to unconditionally accept back to work all striking Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any acts that may aggravate the situation.
Atty. Lita V. Aglibut, Officer-In-Charge of the Legal Service, this Department is hereby designated as the Hearing Officer to hear and receive evidence on all matters and issues arising from the present labor dispute and, thereafter, to submit a report/recommendation within twenty (20) days from the termination of the proceedings.
The parties are further directed to file their respective position papers with Atty. Lita V. Aglibut within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Philcom
Corporation (“Philcom”) filed a motion for reconsideration. Philcom prayed for
reconsideration of the Order impleading it as party-litigant in the present
case and directing it to accept back to work unconditionally all the officers
and members of the union who participated in the strike.[6] Philcom also filed
a Motion to Certify Labor Dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission
for Compulsory Arbitration.[7]
For
its part, Philcom Employees Union (PEU) filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. PEU asked the Secretary
to “partially reconsider” the 2 October 1998 Order insofar as it dismissed the
unfair labor practices charges against Philcom and included the illegal strike
issue in the labor dispute.[8]
The
Secretary denied both motions for reconsideration of Philcom and PEU in its
assailed Order of
The question of whether or not Philcom Corporation should be impleaded has been properly disposed of in the assailed Order. We reiterate that neither the Company herein nor its predecessor was able to convincingly establish that each is a separate entity in the absence of any proof that there was indeed an actual closure and cessation of the operations of the predecessor-company. We would have accommodated the Company for a hearing on the matter had it been willing and prepared to submit evidence to controvert the finding that there was a mere merger. As it now stands, nothing on record would prove that the two (2) companies are separate and distinct from each other.
Having established that what took place was a mere merger, we correspondingly conclude that the employer-employee relations between the Company and the Union officers and members was never severed. And in merger, the employees of the merged companies or entities are deemed absorbed by the new company (Filipinas Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No. 97237, August 16, 1991). Considering that the Company failed miserably to adduce any evidence to provide a basis for a contrary ruling, allegations to the effect that employer-employee relations and positions previously occupied by the workers no longer exist remain just that — mere allegations. Consequently, the Company cannot now exempt itself from compliance with the Order. Neither can it successfully argue that the employees were validly dismissed. As held in Telefunken Semiconductor Employees Union-FFW v. Secretary of Labor and Employment (G.R. Nos. 122743 and 122715, December 12, 1997), to exclude the workers without first ascertaining the extent of their individual participation in the strike or non-compliance with the return-to-work orders will be tantamount to dismissal without due process of law.
With respect to the unfair labor
practice charges against the Company, we have carefully reviewed the records
and found no reason to depart from the findings previously rendered. The issues now being raised by the
Finally, it is our determination
that the issue of the legality of the strike is well within the jurisdiction of
this Office. The same has been properly
submitted and assumed jurisdiction by the Office for resolution.[9]
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, there being no merit in
the remaining Motions for Reconsideration filed by both parties, the same are
hereby DENIED. Our
SO ORDERED.[10]
PEU
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assailing the Secretary’s Orders of
On
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
portions of the Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated
SO ORDERED.[13]
The
Court of Appeals ruled that, contrary to PEU’s view, the Secretary could take
cognizance of an issue, even only incidental to the labor dispute, provided the
issue must be involved in the labor dispute itself or otherwise submitted to
him for resolution.
The
Court of Appeals pointed out that the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute upon Philcom’s petition as a consequence of the strike that PEU
had declared and not because of the notices of strike that PEU filed with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
The
Court of Appeals stated that the reason of the Secretary’s assumption of
jurisdiction over the labor dispute was the staging of the strike.
Consequently, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to the
labor dispute between PEU and Philcom, but also part of the labor dispute
itself. Thus, the Court of Appeals held
that it was proper for the Secretary to take cognizance of the issue on the
legality of the strike.
The
Court of Appeals also ruled that for an employee to claim an unfair labor
practice by the employer, the employee must show that the act charged as unfair
labor practice falls under Article 248 of the Labor Code. The Court of Appeals
held that the acts enumerated in Article 248 relate to the workers’ right to
self-organization. The Court of Appeals
stated that if the act complained of has nothing to do with the acts enumerated
in Article 248, there is no unfair labor practice.
The
Court of Appeals held that Philcom’s acts, which PEU complained of as unfair
labor practices, were not in any way related to the workers’ right to
self-organization under Article 248 of the Labor Code. The Court of Appeals held that PEU’s
complaint constitutes an enumeration of mere grievances which should have been
threshed out through the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration outlined
in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The
Court of Appeals also held that even if by Philcom’s acts, Philcom had violated
the provisions of the CBA, still those acts do not constitute unfair labor
practices under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
The Court of Appeals held that PEU failed to show that those violations
were gross or that there was flagrant or malicious refusal on the part of
Philcom to comply with the economic provisions of the CBA.
The
Court of Appeals stated that as of
Hence,
this petition.
In
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner contends that:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals has failed to faithfully adhere with the decisions of the Supreme Court when it affirmed the order/resolution of the Secretary of Labor denying the Union’s Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcom’s Position Paper and including the issue of illegal strike notwithstanding the absence of any petition to declare the strike illegal.
2.
The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided a question
of substance in a way not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed
the order/resolution of the Secretary of Labor dismissing the
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has departed from the edict of applicable law and jurisprudence when it failed to issue such order mandating/directing the issuance of a writ of execution directing the Company to unconditionally accept back to work the Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike and as well as to pay their salaries/backwages and the monetary equivalent of their other benefits from October 6, 1998 to date.[15]
The
Ruling of the Court
The
petition must fail.
PEU
contends that the Secretary should not have taken cognizance of the issue on
the alleged illegal strike because it was not properly submitted to the
Secretary for resolution. PEU asserts
that after Philcom submitted its position paper where it raised the issue of
the legality of the strike, PEU immediately opposed the same by filing its Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions
of and Attachments in Philcom’s Position Paper. PEU asserts that it stated in its
Manifestation/Motion that certain portions of Philcom’s position paper and some
of its attachments were “irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the issues
assumed for resolution.” Thus, PEU
asserts that the Court of Appeals should not have affirmed the Secretary’s
order denying PEU’s Manifestation/Motion.
PEU
also contends that, contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the
Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute was based on the
two notices of strike that PEU filed with the NCMB. PEU asserts that only the issues on unfair
labor practice and bargaining deadlock should be resolved in the present case.
PEU
insists that to include the issue on the legality of the strike despite its
opposition would convert the case into a petition to declare the strike
illegal.
PEU’s
contentions are untenable.
The
Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the
strike. As the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out, since the very reason of the Secretary’s assumption of
jurisdiction was PEU’s declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the
strike is not merely incidental to, but is essentially involved in, the labor
dispute itself.
Article
263(g) of the Labor Code provides:
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
x x
x x.
The
powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have
been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, with the
aim of promoting public good.[16] When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted “great breadth of discretion”
in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the
automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has
already taken place.[17]
In
this case, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls
in an industry indispensable to the national interest. As noted by the Secretary ─
[T]he Company has
been a vital part of the telecommunications industry for 73 years. It is particularly noted for its expertise
and dominance in the area of international telecommunications. Thus, it performs a vital role in providing
critical services indispensable to the national interest. It is for this very reason that this Office
strongly opines that any concerted action, particularly a prolonged work
stoppage is fraught with dire consequences.
Surely, the on-going strike will adversely affect not only the livelihood
of workers and their dependents, but also the company’s suppliers and dealers,
both in the public and private sectors who depend on the company’s facilities
in the day-to-day operations of their businesses and commercial transactions. The operational viability of the company is
likewise adversely affected, especially its expansion program for which it has
incurred debts in the approximate amount of
P2 Billion. Any prolonged
work stoppage will also bring about substantial losses in terms of lost tax
revenue for the government and would surely pose a serious set back in the
company’s modernization program.
At this critical time when government is working to sustain the economic gains already achieved, it is the paramount concern of this Office to avert any unnecessary work stoppage and, if one has already occurred, to minimize its deleterious effect on the workers, the company, the industry and national economy as a whole.[18]
It is of no moment that PEU never
acquiesced to the submission for resolution of the issue on the legality of the
strike. PEU cannot prevent resolution of
the legality of the strike by merely refusing to submit the issue for
resolution. It is also immaterial that
this issue, as PEU asserts, was not properly submitted for resolution of the
Secretary.
The
authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national
interest includes and extends to all
questions and controversies arising from such labor dispute. The
power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and
efficiently dispose of the dispute.[19]
Besides, it was upon Philcom’s
petition that the Secretary immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute on
Moreover,
after an examination of the position paper[21]
Philcom submitted to the Secretary, we see no reason to strike out those
portions which PEU seek to expunge from the records. A careful study of all the facts alleged,
issues raised, and arguments presented in the position paper leads us to hold
that the portions PEU seek to expunge are necessary in the resolution of the
present case.
On
the documents attached to Philcom’s position paper, except for Annexes MM-2 to
MM-22 inclusive[22] which
deal with the supposed consolidation of Philippine Global Communications, Inc.
and Philcom Corporation, we find the other annexes relevant and material in the
resolution of the issues that have emerged in this case.
PEU
also claims that Philcom has committed several unfair labor practices. PEU asserts that there are “factual and
evidentiary bases” for the charge of unfair labor practices against Philcom.
On
unfair labor practices of employers, Article 248 of the Labor Code provides:
Unfair labor practices of employers. ─ It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to
wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. x x x
(f) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
Unfair
labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers’ right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers’
right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how
unfair, are not unfair labor practices.[23] The only exception is Article 248(f), which
in any case is not one of the acts specified in PEU’s charge of unfair labor
practice.
A
review of the acts complained of as unfair labor practices of Philcom convinces
us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited acts defined and
enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code. The issues of misimplementation or
non-implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of overtime and other
monetary claims, inadequate transportation allowance, water, and other
facilities, are all a matter of implementation or interpretation of the
economic provisions of the CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance
procedure.
We
find it pertinent to quote certain portions of the assailed Decision, thus —
A reading of private respondent’s
justification for the acts complained of would reveal that they were actually
legitimate reasons and not in anyway related to union busting. Hence, as to compelling employees to render
flexible labor and additional work without additional compensation, it is the
company’s explanation that the employees themselves voluntarily took on work
pertaining to other assignments but closely related to their job description
when there was slack in the business which caused them to be idle. This was the case of the International
Telephone Operators who tried telemarketing when they found themselves with so
much free time due to the slowdown in the demand for international line
services. With respect to the Senior
Combination Technician at the
On the alleged misimplementation
and/or non-implementation of employees’ benefits, such as shoe allowance,
rainboots, raincoats, OIC shift allowance, P450.00 monthly allowance,
driving allowance, motorcycle award and full-time physician, the company gave
the following explanation which this Court finds plausible, to wit:
16. The employees at CTSS were given One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) cash or its equivalent in purchase orders
because it was their own demand that they be given the option to buy the pair
of leather boots they want. For the
17.
The P450.00 monthly allowance
was provided by the CBA to be given to counter clerks. However, the position of counter clerks had
been abolished in accordance with the reorganization plan undertaken by the
company in April 1995, with the full knowledge of the Union membership. As a result of the abolition of the position
of counter clerks, there was no more reason for granting the subject allowance.
18. The company more than satisfied the provision in the CBA to engage the services of a physician and provided adequate medical services. Aside from a part time physician who reports for duty everyday, the company has secured the services of Prolab Diagnostics, which has complete medical facilities and personnel, to serve the medical needs of the employees. x x x
19. The
(Philcom’s Reply to PEU’s Position Paper, pp.352, 354, ibid.)
On the issue of non-payment, discrimination and/or deprivation of overtime, restday work, waiting/stand by time and staff meeting allowance, suffice it to state that there is nothing on record to prove the same. Petitioner did not present evidence substantial enough to support its claim.
As to the alleged inadequate transportation allowance and facilities, the company posits that:
30. The transportation allowances given to the Dasmarinas and Pinugay employees are more than adequate to defray their daily transportation cost. Hence, there is absolutely no justification for an increase in the said allowance. In fact, said employees at Dasmarinas and Pinugay, who are only residing in areas near their place of work, are more privileged as they receive transportation expenses while the rest of the company workers do not.
31. As to the demand for clean drinking water, the company has installed sufficient and potable water inside the Head Office even before the strike was staged by the Union. Any person who visits the Makati Head Office can attest to this fact.
(Philcom’s Reply to PEU’s Position Paper, p. 357, ibid.)
Anent the allegation of PABX transfer and contractualization of PABX service and position, these were done in anticipation of the company to switch to an automatic PABX machine which requires no operator. This cannot be treated as ULP since management is at liberty, absent any malice on its part, to abolish positions which it deems no longer necessary (Arrieta vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 279 SCRA 326, 332). Besides, at the time the company hired a temporary employee to man the machine during daytime, the subject position was vacant while the assumption of the function by the company guard during nighttime was only for a brief period.
With respect to the perceived massive contractualization of the company, said charge cannot be considered as ULP since the hiring of contractual workers did not threaten the security of tenure of regular employees or union members. That only 160 employees out of 400 employees in the company’s payroll were considered rank and file does not of itself indicate unfair labor practice since this is but a company prerogative in connection with its business concerns.
Likewise, the offer or promotions to a few union members is neither unlawful nor an economic inducement. These offers were made in accordance with the legitimate need of the company for the services of these employees to fill positions left vacant by either retirement or resignation of other employees. Besides, a promotion is part of the career growth of employees found competent in their work. Thus, in Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Sanchez (144 SCRA 628, 641), the Supreme Court held that “(T)he promotion of employees to managerial or executive positions rests upon the discretion of management. Managerial positions are offices which can only be held by persons who have the trust of the corporation and its officers. It is the prerogative of management to promote any individual working within the company to a higher position. It should not be inhibited or prevented from doing so. A promotion which is manifestly beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a gratuitous speculation that such a promotion was made simply to deprive the union of the membership of the promoted employee, who after all appears to have accepted his promotion.”
That the promotions were made near or around the time when CBA negotiations were about to be held does not make the company’s action an unfair labor practice. As explained by the company, these promotions were based on the availability of the position and the qualification of the employees promoted (p. 6, Annex “4”, Philcom’s Reply to PEU’s Position Paper; p. 380, ibid.)
On the union’s charge that management disallowed leave of union officers and members to attend union seminar, this is belied by the evidence submitted by the union itself. In a letter to PEU’s President, the company granted the leave of several union officers and members to attend a seminar notwithstanding that its request to be given more details about the affair was left unheeded by the union (Annex “Y”, PEU’s Position Paper; p. 222, ibid.). Those who were denied leave were urgently needed for the operation of the company.
On the ULP issue of disinformation scheme, surveillance and interference with union affairs, these are mere allegations unsupported by facts. The charge of “black propaganda” allegedly committed by the company when it supposedly posted two (2) letters addressed to the Union President is totally baseless. Petitioner presents no proof that it was the company which was behind the incident. On the purported disallowance of union members to observe the July 27, 1997 CBA meeting, the company explained that it only allowed one (1) employee from ITTO, instead of two (2), as it would adversely affect the operation of the group. It also took into consideration the fact that ITTO members represent only 20% of the union. Other union members from other departments of the company should have equal representation (Annex "L”, Position Paper for the Union; pp. 205-206, ibid.). As to the alleged surveillance of the company guards during a union seminar, We find the idea of sending guards to spy on a mere union seminar quite preposterous. It is thus not likely for the company which can gain nothing from it to waste its resources in such a scheme.
On the issuance of memorandum/notice to employees without giving copy to union, change in work schedule at Traffic Records Section and ITTO policies, the company has sufficiently rebutted the same, thus:
27. The Union also whines about the failure of the company to furnish copies of memoranda or notices sent to employees and change of work schedules at the Traffic Records Section and ITTO policies. The CBA, however, does not obligate the Company to give the Union a copy of each and every memorandum or notice sent to employees. This would be unreasonable and impractical. Neither did the Union demand that they be furnished copies of the same. This is clearly a non-issue as copies of all memoranda or notices issued by management are readily available upon request by any employee or the Union.
28. Contrary to the allegations of the Union, the rationale and mechanics for the abolishment of the midnight schedule at the Traffic Record Services had been thoroughly and adequately discussed with the Union’s President, Robert Benosa, and the staff of Traffic Record Services in the meeting held on May 9, 1997. The midnight services were abolished for purely economic reasons. The company realized that the midnight work can be handled in the morning without hampering normal operations. At the same time, the company will be able to save on cost. For this objective, the employees concerned agreed to create a manning and shifting schedule starting at 6:00 a.m. up to 10:00 p.m., with each employee rendering only eight hours of work every day without violating any provision of the labor laws or the CBA.[24]
The Court has always respected a
company’s exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its
operations. Thus, we have held that
management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment,
all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, supervision and
transfer of employees, working methods, time, place and manner of work.[25]
This is so because the law on unfair
labor practices is not intended to deprive employers of their fundamental right
to prescribe and enforce such rules as they honestly believe to be necessary to
the proper, productive and profitable operation of their business.[26]
Even
assuming arguendo that Philcom had
violated some provisions in the CBA, there was no showing that the same was a
flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. The law mandates that such violations should
not be treated as unfair labor practices.[27]
PEU
also asserts that the Court of Appeals should have issued an order directing
the issuance of a writ of execution ordering Philcom to accept back to work
unconditionally the striking union officers and members under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike.
PEU asserts that the union officers and members should be paid their
salaries or backwages and monetary equivalent of other benefits beginning 6
October 1998 when PEU received a copy of the Secretary’s 2 October 1998
return-to-work order.
PEU
claims that even if the “issue of illegal strike can be included in the assailed
orders and that the union officers and members have been terminated as a result
of the alleged illegal strike, still, the Secretary has to rule on the
illegality of the strike and the liability of each striker.” PEU asserts that the union officers and
members should first be accepted back to work because a return-to-work order is
immediately executory.[28]
We
rule on the legality of the strike if only to put an end to this protracted
labor dispute. The facts necessary to
resolve the legality of the strike are not in dispute.
The
strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were patently illegal
for the following reasons:
1. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by Presidential Decree No. 823 (PD 823), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 849, from strikes and lockouts. PD 823, as amended, provides:
Sec. 1. It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining within the framework of compulsory and voluntary arbitration. Therefore, all forms of strikes, picketings and lockouts are hereby strictly prohibited in vital industries, such as in public utilities, including transportation and communications, x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Enumerating
the industries considered as vital, Letter of Instruction No. 368 provides:
For the guidance of workers and employers, some of whom have been led into filing notices of strikes and lockouts even in vital industries, you are hereby instructed to consider the following as vital industries and companies or firms under PD 823 as amended:
1. Public Utilities:
x
x x x
B. Communications:
1) Wire or wireless telecommunications such as telephone, telegraph, telex, and cable companies or firms; (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
It is therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard to vital industries.
2. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997, the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their strike.
Regardless of their motives, or the
validity of their claims, the striking employees should have ceased or desisted
from all acts that would undermine the authority given the Secretary under
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. They
could not defy the return-to-work orders by citing Philcom’s alleged unfair
labor practices to justify such defiance.[29]
PEU could not have validly anchored
its defiance to the return-to-work orders on the motion for reconsideration
that it had filed on the assumption of jurisdiction order. A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory despite
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any
petition questioning its validity.[30]
The records show that on 22 November
1997, Philcom published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer a notice to striking employees to return to work.[31] These employees did not report back to work
but continued their mass action. In fact, they lifted their picket lines only
on 22 December 1997.[32]
Philcom formally notified twice
these employees to explain in writing why they should not be dismissed for
defying the return-to-work order.[33] Philcom held
administrative hearings on these disciplinary cases.[34]
Thereafter, Philcom dismissed these employees for abandonment of work in
defiance of the return-to-work order.[35]
A return-to-work order imposes a duty
that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey,
they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.[36]
The following provision of the Labor
Code governs the effects of defying a return-to-work order:
ART. 264. Prohibited activities. ─ (a) x x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout x x x x
Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike, shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis supplied)
A
strike undertaken despite the Secretary’s issuance of an assumption or
certification order becomes a prohibited
activity, and thus, illegal, under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union
officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have
lost their employment status. The union
members, including union officers, who commit specific illegal acts or
who knowingly defy a return-to-work order are also deemed to have lost their
employment status.[37] Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to
return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while
retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to
fill up their positions.[38]
Hence,
the failure of PEU’s officers and members to comply immediately with the
return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997 cannot be
condoned. Defiance of the return-to-work orders of the Secretary constitutes a
valid ground for dismissal.[39]
3. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means
and methods.
Even
if the strike in the present case was not illegal per se, the strike activities that PEU had undertaken, especially
the establishment of human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the
company premises and the use of coercive methods to prevent company officials
and other personnel from leaving the company premises, were definitely illegal.[40] PEU is deemed to have admitted that its
officers and members had committed these illegal acts, as it never disputed
Philcom’s assertions of PEU’s unlawful strike activities in all the pleadings
that PEU submitted to the Secretary and to this Court.
PEU’s
picketing officers and members prohibited other tenants at the Philcom building
from entering and leaving the premises.
Leonida S. Rabe, Country Manager of Societe
Internationale De Telecommunications Aeronautiques (SITA), a tenant at the
Philcom building, wrote two letters addressed to PEU President Roberto B.
Benosa. She told Benosa that PEU’s act
of obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the company premises “has
badly disrupted normal operations of their organization.”[41]
The
right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal
constrictions. Article 264(e) of the
Labor Code, on prohibited activities, provides:
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
The
Labor Code is emphatic against the use of violence, coercion, and intimidation
during a strike and to this end prohibits the obstruction of free passage to
and from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes. A picketing labor union has no right to
prevent employees of another company from getting in and out of its rented
premises, otherwise, it will be held liable for damages for its acts against an
innocent by-stander.[42]
The
sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe that any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.[43]
By
insisting on staging the prohibited strike and defiantly picketing Philcom’s
premises to prevent the resumption of company operations, the striking
employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted.[44]
4.
PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation
proceedings at the NCMB.
On
Section 6. Conciliation. ─
x x
x x
During the proceedings, the parties
shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of
dispute. They are obliged, as part of
their duty, to bargain collectively in good faith, to participate fully and
promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the
Board. x x x x
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike “during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike.”
Lamentably,
PEU defiantly proceeded with their strike during the pendency of the
conciliation proceedings.
5. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA.
By PEU’s own admission, “the
The bottom line is that PEU should
have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA.[51] In disregarding this procedure, the union
leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. The law cannot interpose its hand to protect
them from the consequences of their illegal acts.[52]
A strike declared on the basis of
grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as
stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal.[53]
Having held the strike illegal and
having found that PEU’s officers and members have committed illegal acts during
the strike, we hold that no writ of execution should issue for the return to
work of PEU officers who participated in the illegal strike, and PEU members
who committed illegal acts or who defied the return-to-work orders that the
Secretary issued on 19 November 1997 and 28 November 1997. The issue of who participated in the illegal
strike, committed illegal acts, or defied the return-to-work orders is a
question of fact that must be resolved in the appropriate proceedings before
the Secretary of Labor.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53989, with the MODIFICATION that the Secretary of
Labor is directed to determine who among the Philcom Employees Union officers
participated in the illegal strike, and who among the union members committed
illegal acts or defied the return-to-work orders of 19 November 1997 and 28
November 1997. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Fermin
A. Martin, Jr., with Associate Justices
[3] Rollo, pp. 871-874.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] 364 Phil. 44 (1999).
[13]
[15] Rollo, pp. 52-53.
[16] Manila Diamond Hotel Employees’ Union v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140518, 16 December 2004, 447 SCRA 97.
[17] Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.-Unlicensed Crews Employees Union-Associated Labor Unions (Tasli-Alu) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145428, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 610.
[18] Rollo, pp. 691-692.
[19] LMG
Chemicals Corporation v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
G.R. No. 127422, 17 April 2001, 356
SCRA 577; International Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. Nos. 92981-83, 9 January 1992, 205 SCRA
59.
[20] Rollo, p. 579.
[21]
[22]
[23] Great Pacific Life Employees Union v. Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 126717, 11 February 1999, 303 SCRA 113; Cesario A. Azucena, Jr., II The Labor Code with Comments and Cases 210 (5th ed. 2004) [The Labor Code with Comments and Cases].
[24] Rollo, pp. 880-886.
[25] Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte, G.R. No. 154689, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 287; Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Fianza, G.R. No. 158606, 9 March 2004, 425 SCRA 41.
[26] II The Labor Code with Comments and Cases 214.
[27] ART. 261, Labor Code. x x x Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
[29] Allied
Banking Corp. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 116128,
[30] Telefunken
Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Sec. of Labor and Employment, 347
Phil. 447 (1997); St. Scholastica’s
College v. Torres, G.R. No. 100158,
[31] Rollo, p. 444.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] Asian
Transmission Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 88725,
[37] Grand Boulevard Hotel v. Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (GLOWHRAIN), 454 Phil. 463 (2003).
[38]
[39] Allied Banking Corp. v. NLRC, supra note 29.
[40] Federation
of Free Workers v. Inciong, G.R. No. 49983,
[41] Rollo, pp. 445-448.
[42] Liwayway
Publications, Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers
[43] Great Pacific Life Employees Union v. Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, supra note 23.
[44]
[45] Rollo, p. 443.
[46] San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, 451 Phil. 514 (2003).
[47] Rollo, p. 70.
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52] Tiu v. NLRC, 343 Phil. 478 (1997).
[53] II The Labor Code with Comments and Cases 443.